All hands,
Some of our guys in the Naval Service thought that for nowadays, the naval special operation forces is more useful, more frightening, could create a deterrence effect than our warship. Oh my God, this is the craziest thing I ever heard as long as I serve in the beloved Navy. How could they thought that way?
I think, first of all, we should know who we are, what are our characters and why people call us Navy. Who we are? Navy or Army? Where we serve? At sea or on the land?
People call us Navy because we have warships, we serve at sea and we do have the specific characters and customs that make different compare to the Army. We are guarding the national interest at sea, yesterday, today, tomorrow and forever.
Frankly, no ship… no Navy. If we depend on our special operation forces for naval operation, then what are our differences compare to the Army? People out there will laugh to see what we thought about a Navy. They thought we are in progress of transformation, from Naval Service to quasi-Army Service.
If we thought like that, I suggest that naval and maritime operation should not be teach again in our Naval Command and Staff College. Let’s abandon about Mahan’s or Till’s or Collomb’s brother or other naval strategist’s thought on naval operation. And then let’s embrace Jomini’s, Clausewitz’s, Rommel’s etc thought on land operation.
I think our main problem is how to create a deterrent. For Navy, the choice is through it’s weapons system, particularly warship. Half of our warship is the aging things and that’s why our deterrence effect can not work on the field so far. How to deal with it? First, replace those ships based on priorities. It’s still on progress so far. Second, adopt the effect-based operations. This second thing is the hardest one, I think.
Some of our guys in the Naval Service thought that for nowadays, the naval special operation forces is more useful, more frightening, could create a deterrence effect than our warship. Oh my God, this is the craziest thing I ever heard as long as I serve in the beloved Navy. How could they thought that way?
I think, first of all, we should know who we are, what are our characters and why people call us Navy. Who we are? Navy or Army? Where we serve? At sea or on the land?
People call us Navy because we have warships, we serve at sea and we do have the specific characters and customs that make different compare to the Army. We are guarding the national interest at sea, yesterday, today, tomorrow and forever.
Frankly, no ship… no Navy. If we depend on our special operation forces for naval operation, then what are our differences compare to the Army? People out there will laugh to see what we thought about a Navy. They thought we are in progress of transformation, from Naval Service to quasi-Army Service.
If we thought like that, I suggest that naval and maritime operation should not be teach again in our Naval Command and Staff College. Let’s abandon about Mahan’s or Till’s or Collomb’s brother or other naval strategist’s thought on naval operation. And then let’s embrace Jomini’s, Clausewitz’s, Rommel’s etc thought on land operation.
I think our main problem is how to create a deterrent. For Navy, the choice is through it’s weapons system, particularly warship. Half of our warship is the aging things and that’s why our deterrence effect can not work on the field so far. How to deal with it? First, replace those ships based on priorities. It’s still on progress so far. Second, adopt the effect-based operations. This second thing is the hardest one, I think.
1 komentar:
very good opinion ..
Let's increase our naval ... just for Indonesia
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